操纵的复杂性，贿赂，和竞选管理在Bucklin和后备投票
Complexity of Manipulation, Bribery, and Campaign Management in Bucklin and Fallback Voting
摘要：
计算社会选择的一个中心主题是研究投票系统在计算上抵抗试图影响选举结果的操纵攻击（例如操纵）的程度（即，战略投票）、控制和贿赂。Bucklin和回退投票是具有最广泛阻力的投票系统之一（即，NP-硬度）来控制攻击。然而，人们对他们在操纵和贿赂攻击方面的行为知之甚少。我们全面调查的计算阻力Bucklin和回退投票的许多常见的操纵和贿赂的情况下，我们还补充我们的讨论，考虑几个竞选管理问题Bucklin和回退。
英文摘要：
A central theme in computational social choice is to study the extent to which voting systems computationally resist manipulative attacks seeking to influence the outcome of elections, such as manipulation (i.e., strategic voting), control, and bribery. Bucklin and fallback voting are among the voting systems with the broadest resistance (i.e., NP-hardness) to control attacks. However, only little is known about their behavior regarding manipulation and bribery attacks. We comprehensively investigate the computational resistance of Bucklin and fallback voting for many of the common manipulation and bribery scenarios; we also complement our discussion by considering several campaign management problems for Bucklin and fallback.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
