安全贿赂有多难？
How Hard is Safe Bribery?
AI总结：
本文提出安全贿赂问题，即贿赂者需确保即使被贿赂选民不完全遵循建议，也不会更偏好原获胜者，并针对多种常见投票规则给出了该问题的复杂性理论结果。
摘要：
选举中的贿赂是计算社会选择中研究较为充分的一类控制问题。本文提出并研究了安全贿赂问题。在此问题中，贿赂者的目标是要求被贿赂的选民以某种方式投票，使得即使被贿赂的选民没有完全遵循贿赂者的建议，贿赂者也不会更偏好（未贿赂选举的）原获胜者而非新获胜者。实际上，在贿赂的许多应用中，例如竞选活动，贿赂者通常对被贿赂的选民是否最终遵循其建议的控制有限，因此可以设想被贿赂的选民可能部分或完全忽略贿赂者的建议。本文针对多种常见投票规则，提供了安全贿赂问题的全面复杂性理论图景。
英文摘要：
Bribery in an election is one of the well-studied control problems in computational social choice. In this paper, we propose and study the safe bribery problem. Here the goal of the briber is to ask the bribed voters to vote in such a way that the briber never prefers the original winner (of the unbribed election) more than the new winner, even if the bribed voters do not fully follow the briber's advice. Indeed, in many applications of bribery, campaigning for example, the briber often has limited control on whether the bribed voters eventually follow her recommendation and thus it is conceivable that the bribed voters can either partially or fully ignore the briber's recommendation. We provide a comprehensive complexity theoretic landscape of the safe bribery problem for many common voting rules in this paper.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
