arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2002.10982math.OCecon.GNq-fin.EC
收藏

随机水平委托代理问题

Random horizon principal-agent problems

Yiqing Lin, Zhenjie Ren, Nizar Touzi, Junjian Yang

摘要:

本文考虑了具有连续支付和终止时一次性支付的随机水平委托代理问题的一般形式。在这个问题的欧洲版本中,随机视界完全由委托人选择,代理人除了对输出过程的动态施加努力之外没有其他可能的行动。我们还考虑了美国版本的合同,其中包括开创性的Sannikov的模型,代理人也可以退出最佳选择的终止时间的合同。我们的主要结果减少这样的非零和随机微分对策适当的随机控制问题,可以解决标准的方法随机控制理论。这种简化是通过遵循Sannikov的方法获得的,该方法由Cvitanic,Possamai和Touzi进一步发展。我们首先介绍了一个适当的类的合同,代理人的最佳努力的特点是立即在随机控制理论的标准验证参数。然后,我们表明,这一类的合同是密集的在适当的意义上,使这个限制家庭的合同的优化代表不失一般性。该结果是利用最近随机水平二阶倒向离散问题的适定性结果得到的。

英文摘要:

We consider a general formulation of the random horizon Principal-Agent problem with a continuous payment and a lump-sum payment at termination. In the European version of the problem, the random horizon is chosen solely by the principal with no other possible action from the agent than exerting effort on the dynamics of the output process. We also consider the American version of the contract, which covers the seminal Sannikov's model, where the agent can also quit by optimally choosing the termination time of the contract. Our main result reduces such non-zero-sum stochastic differential games to appropriate stochastic control problems which may be solved by standard methods of stochastic control theory. This reduction is obtained by following Sannikov's approach, further developed by Cvitanic, Possamai, and Touzi. We first introduce an appropriate class of contracts for which the agent's optimal effort is immediately characterized by the standard verification argument in stochastic control theory. We then show that this class of contracts is dense in an appropriate sense so that the optimization over this restricted family of contracts represents no loss of generality. The result is obtained by using the recent well-posedness result of random horizon second-order backward SDE.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑