有 adverse selection 的委托-代理问题:一个随机目标问题的 formulation
Principal-agent problems with adverse selection: A stochastic target problem formulation
AI总结:
本文研究了存在逆向选择的委托-代理问题,通过将代理的优化问题转化为随机目标问题,解决了委托人在信息不完全情况下的最优合同设计问题。
摘要:
我们研究了一个存在逆向选择的委托-代理问题,其中委托人不知道代理的真实成本,必须设计一个合同以优化特定标准。不同于标准的筛选框架允许自我选择,我们假设委托人只能提供一个唯一的合同。我们证明代理的优化问题可以重新表述为一个随机目标问题。在刻画此目标问题的可信域后,我们显示委托人的目标可以解决为一个具有部分信息和状态约束的随机最优控制问题。描述可信域也允许我们获得筛选合同的价值。
英文摘要:
We study a principal-agent problem with adverse selection, where the principal does not know the agent's true cost but must design a contract to optimize a specific criterion. Unlike standard screening frameworks that allow for self-selection, we assume the principal can only offer a unique contract. We show that the agent's optimization problem can be reformulated as a stochastic target problem. After characterizing the credible domain of this target problem, we show that the principal's objective can be solved as a stochastic optimal control problem with partial information and state constraints. The description of the credible domain also allows us to obtain the value of screening contracts.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。