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arXiv 2308.13804econ.TH
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委托-代理模型中的多元优超

Multivariate Majorization in Principal-Agents Models

Nicholas C Bedard, Jacob K Goeree, Ningyi Sun

AI总结:

该研究提出经济学领域新的多元优超定义,将经典熨平方法推广到多元委托-代理问题,适用于两类类型空间,还拓展了二阶随机占优的多维形式,为契约理论、机制设计及多元风险决策提供新工具。

摘要:

我们提出了经济学文献中尚未出现的多元优超(multivariate majorization)定义。该优超技术可将Mussa和Rosen(1978)提出的“熨平(ironing)”方法推广至一类广泛的多元委托-代理问题。具体而言,我们研究的逆向选择问题中,代理人类型为一维,但信息外部性会产生多维熨平问题。该优超技术同时适用于离散和连续类型空间,我们验证了其在契约理论与机制设计中的实用性。我们进一步表明,多元优超是二阶随机占优向多维的自然拓展,并推导了其在多元风险下决策的相关含义。

英文摘要:

We introduce a definition of multivariate majorization that is new to the economics literature. Our majorization technique allows us to generalize Mussa and Rosen's (1978) "ironing" to a broad class of multivariate principal-agents problems. Specifically, we consider adverse selection problems in which agents' types are one dimensional but informational externalities create a multidimensional ironing problem. Our majorization technique applies to discrete and continuous type spaces alike and we demonstrate its usefulness for contract theory and mechanism design. We further show that multivariate majorization yields a natural extension of second-order stochastic dominance to multiple dimensions and derive its implications for decision making under multivariate risk.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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