arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1903.07752math.OC
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时态逻辑目标的激励设计

Incentive Design for Temporal Logic Objectives

Yagiz Savas, Vijay Gupta, Melkior Ornik, Lillian J. Ratliff, Ufuk Topcu

摘要:

我们研究的问题是设计一个最优的激励序列,委托人应该提供给代理人,使代理人的最佳行为下的激励实现委托人的目标表示为一个时态逻辑公式。我们考虑一个有限的决策水平和模型的决策过程作为一个马尔可夫决策过程(MDP)的代理。在一定的假设下,我们提出了一个多项式时间算法来合成一个激励序列,使成本最小化的委托人。我们表明,如果底层MDP只有确定性的过渡,主要可以隐藏其目标的代理人,仍然实现所需的行为,通过激励。另一方面,一个MDP与随机过渡可能需要的主要与代理共享其目标。最后,我们证明了所提出的方法在运动规划的例子中,主要改变代理的最佳轨迹,通过提供激励。

英文摘要:

We study the problem of designing an optimal sequence of incentives that a principal should offer to an agent so that the agent's optimal behavior under the incentives realizes the principal's objective expressed as a temporal logic formula. We consider an agent with a finite decision horizon and model its decision-making process as a Markov decision process (MDP). Under certain assumptions, we present a polynomial-time algorithm to synthesize an incentive sequence that minimizes the cost to the principal. We show that if the underlying MDP has only deterministic transitions, the principal can hide its objective from the agent and still realize the desired behavior through incentives. On the other hand, an MDP with stochastic transitions may require the principal to share its objective with the agent. Finally, we demonstrate the proposed method in motion planning examples where a principal changes the optimal trajectory of an agent by providing incentives.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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