We study the problem of designing an optimal sequence of incentives that a principal should offer to an agent so that the agent's optimal behavior under the incentives realizes the principal's objective expressed as a temporal logic formula. We consider an agent with a finite decision horizon and model its decision-making process as a Markov decision process (MDP). Under certain assumptions, we present a polynomial-time algorithm to synthesize an incentive sequence that minimizes the cost to the principal. We show that if the underlying MDP has only deterministic transitions, the principal can hide its objective from the agent and still realize the desired behavior through incentives. On the other hand, an MDP with stochastic transitions may require the principal to share its objective with the agent. Finally, we demonstrate the proposed method in motion planning examples where a principal changes the optimal trajectory of an agent by providing incentives.
Social welfare optimisation in well-mixed and structured populations
Faculty of Computer Science and Engineering, Ho Chi Minh City University of Technology (HCMUT), Vietnam(计算机科学与工程学院,胡志明市技术大学(HCMUT));Vietnam National University - Ho Chi Minh City (VNU-HCM), Vietnam(越南国家大学-胡志明市(VNU-HCM))
Social welfare optimisation under institutional reward and punishment
Faculty of Computer Science and Engineering, Ho Chi Minh City University of Technology (HCMUT), Vietnam(胡志明市技术大学计算机科学与工程学院,越南);Vietnam National University - Ho Chi Minh City (VNU-HCM), Vietnam(越南胡志明市国家大学(VNU-HCM),越南);School of Computing, Engineering and Digital Technologies, Teesside University, United Kingdom(泰赛德大学计算、工程与数字技术学院,英国);School of Mathematics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom(伯明翰大学数学学院,英国)