一个校长和许多代理人的故事
A tale of a Principal and many many Agents
摘要:
本文研究了有限时间内的道德风险问题,该道德风险问题具有一次$-$和和连续支付,涉及无限多个具有平均场型相互作用的代理人,由一个委托人雇佣.通过重新解释的平均$-$领域的游戏面临的每个代理人的平均场向前倒向随机微分方程(简称FBDEs),我们能够重写的主要问题作为一个控制问题的McKean $-$ Vlasov的SDES。我们回顾了最近在[1,43,44,45,46]中介绍的一种解决这个问题的一般方法,该方法使用动态规划和Hamilton $-$ Jacobi $-$ Bellman(简称HJB)方程,并提到了第二种基于随机Pontryagin最大值原理的方法,该方法如下[10]。我们完全和明确地解决了特殊情况下的问题,超越了通常的线性$-$二次框架。最后,我们在我们的例子中表明,$N-$球员模型中的最优合同收敛到平均$-$场最优合同时,代理的数量去$+\infty$,从而说明在我们的特定设置的一般结果[8]。
英文摘要:
In this paper, we investigate a moral hazard problem in finite time with lump$-$sum and continuous payments, involving infinitely many Agents with mean field type interactions, hired by one Principal. By reinterpreting the mean$-$field game faced by each Agent in terms of a mean field forward backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE for short), we are able to rewrite the Principal's problem as a control problem of McKean$-$Vlasov SDEs. We review one general approache to tackle it, introduced recently in [1, 43, 44, 45, 46] using dynamic programming and Hamilton$-$Jacobi$-$Bellman (HJB for short) equations, and mention a second one based on the stochastic Pontryagin maximum principle, which follows [10]. We solve completely and explicitly the problem in special cases, going beyond the usual linear$-$quadratic framework. We finally show in our examples that the optimal contract in the $N-$players' model converges to the mean$-$field optimal contract when the number of agents goes to $+\infty$, thus illustrating in our specific setting the general results of [8].
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