具有委托人和代理人场的国家契约理论
Finite-State Contract Theory with a Principal and a Field of Agents
摘要:
我们使用最近开发的概率分析的平均场游戏与许多国家的弱制定,建立一个委托人/代理合同理论模型,其中的主要面临着大量的代理人在平均场的方式进行交互。我们减少了这个问题的最优控制的McKean-Vlasov型的动态,我们解决了这个问题,明确在一个特殊的情况下,让人想起线性二次平均场对策模型。本文最后用一个数值例子证明了权力的结果时,适用于一个简单的例子,流行病遏制。
英文摘要:
We use the recently developed probabilistic analysis of mean field games with finitely many states in the weak formulation, to set-up a principal / agent contract theory model where the principal faces a large population of agents interacting in a mean field manner. We reduce the problem to the optimal control of dynamics of the McKean-Vlasov type, and we solve this problem explicitly in a special case reminiscent of the linear - quadratic mean field game models. The paper concludes with a numerical example demonstrating the power of the results when applied to a simple example of epidemic containment.
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