竞争性互动代理的合约理论
Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents
AI总结:
本文研究了在竞争性绩效考量下,企业与多个代理之间的最优合约设计,通过多维二次BSDEs方法,得出了第一最佳和道德风险下的最优线性合约方案,强调了代理竞争倾向与项目波动性之间的关系。
摘要:
在Holmström和Milgrom框架下,本文研究了企业与多个代理之间的最优合约。每个代理负责一个项目,可对其自身项目施加努力,并影响其他项目。考虑代理之间的竞争性绩效考量,推导了第一最佳和道德风险下的最优合约。方法基于纳什均衡与多维二次BSDEs的联系,最优合约为线性,每个代理获得所有项目终端值的固定比例支付,同时获得其保留效用。高竞争倾向的代理被分配低波动性项目,甚至获得其他代理的帮助。从企业角度看,强多样化代理的竞争倾向有利于企业利益。
英文摘要:
In a framework close to the one developed by Holmström and Milgrom [44], we study the optimal contracting scheme between a Principal and several Agents. Each hired Agent is in charge of one project, and can make efforts towards managing his own project, as well as impact (positively or negatively) the projects of the other Agents. Considering economic Agents in competition with relative performance concerns, we derive the optimal contracts in both first best and moral hazard settings. The enhanced resolution methodology relies heavily on the connection between Nash equilibria and multidimensional quadratic BSDEs. The optimal contracts are linear and each agent is paid a fixed proportion of the terminal value of all the projects of the firm. Besides, each Agent receives his reservation utility, and those with high competitive appetence are assigned less volatile projects, and shall even receive help from the other Agents. From the principal point of view, it is in the firm interest in our model to strongly diversify the competitive appetence of the Agents.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。