VUCA世界中的契约理论
Contract theory in a VUCA world
摘要:
本文研究了一类具有不确定性和道德风险的委托代理问题。我们通过将Stackelberg均衡与最坏情况方法相结合,扩展了Holmström和Milgrom的开创性框架。我们在Cvitanić,Possama和Touzi(2018)的精神下研究了一个一般模型。我们证明了最优契约依赖于输出及其二次变差,作为Mastrolia和Possama(2016)(通过放弃所有限制性假设)和Sung(2015)(通过考虑一般类别的可接受契约)工作的扩展。我们的最佳反应努力的代理商通过解决方案的二阶Becomy和我们表明,该问题的主要是Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs方程的粘性解的值,而不需要一个动态规划原则,通过使用随机Perron的方法。
英文摘要:
In this paper we investigate a Principal-Agent problem with moral hazard under Knightian uncertainty. We extend the seminal framework of Holmström and Milgrom by combining a Stackelberg equilibrium with a worst-case approach. We investigate a general model in the spirit of Cvitanić, Possamaï and Touzi (2018). We show that optimal contracts depend on the output and its quadratic variation, as an extension of the works of Mastrolia and Possamaï (2016) (by dropping all the restrictive assumptions) and Sung (2015) (by considering a general class of admissible contracts). We characterize the best reaction effort of the agent through the solution to a second order BSDE and we show that the value of the problem of the Principal is the viscosity solution of an Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation, without needing a dynamic programming principle, by using stochastic Perron's method.
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