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arXiv 1905.09202math.PRmath.OC
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可再生资源开发监管

Regulation of renewable resource exploitation

Idris Kharroubi, Thomas Lim, Thibaut Mastrolia

摘要:

我们调查的监管政策的影响施加在一个代理人利用可能的可再生自然资源。我们采用委托代理模型,委托人寻找合同,即税收/补偿,导致代理人达到一定程度的剥削。对于一个给定的合同,我们首先描述代理的最佳收获使用的贝叶斯理论。在系数的正则性和有界性假设下,我们将几乎最优合同表示为HJB方程的解。然后,我们将结果扩展到具有较少规律性和自然资源的逻辑动力学的系数。最后,我们通过数值例子来说明我们的模型中的监管的影响。

英文摘要:

We investigate the impact of a regulation policy imposed on an agent exploiting a possibly renewable natural resource. We adopt a principal-agent model in which the Principal looks for a contract, i.e. taxes/compensations, leading the Agent to a certain level of exploitation. For a given contract, we first describe the Agent's optimal harvest using the BSDE theory. Under regularity and boundedness assumptions on the coefficients, we express almost optimal contracts as solutions to HJB equations. We then extend the result to coefficients with less regularity and logistic dynamics for the natural resource. We end by numerical examples to illustrate the impact of the regulation in our model.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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