最优能源需求响应管理的平均场道德风险
Mean-field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management
摘要:
我们研究了电力市场中的需求响应合同的问题,通过量化的影响,考虑平均场的消费者,其消费是由一个共同的噪音。我们制定的问题作为一个委托代理问题的道德风险,其中的主要-她-是一个电力生产商谁不断观察的消费连续的风险厌恶的消费者,并设计合同,以减少她的生产成本。更确切地说,生产者激励消费者减少不同用途的消费的平均值和波动性,而不观察他们所做的努力。我们证明,生产者可以受益于考虑消费者的平均场指数合同的消费一个代理和总消费统计分布的整个消费者。在线性能源估值的情况下,我们提供了封闭形式的表达这种新型的最优合同,最大化生产者的效用。在大多数情况下,我们表明,这种新型的合同允许委托人选择她想承担的风险,并减少手头的问题,一个不相关的。
英文摘要:
We study the problem of demand response contracts in electricity markets by quantifying the impact of considering a mean-field of consumers, whose consumption is impacted by a common noise. We formulate the problem as a Principal-Agent problem with moral hazard in which the Principal - she - is an electricity producer who observes continuously the consumption of a continuum of risk-averse consumers, and designs contracts in order to reduce her production costs. More precisely, the producer incentivises the consumers to reduce the average and the volatility of their consumption in different usages, without observing the efforts they make. We prove that the producer can benefit from considering the mean-field of consumers by indexing contracts on the consumption of one Agent and aggregate consumption statistics from the distribution of the entire population of consumers. In the case of linear energy valuation, we provide closed-form expression for this new type of optimal contracts that maximises the utility of the producer. In most cases, we show that this new type of contracts allows the Principal to choose the risks she wants to bear, and to reduce the problem at hand to an uncorrelated one.
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