具有道德风险、协同效应和意外事件的代理问题与代理人的平均场系统
Agency problem and mean field system of agents with moral hazard, synergistic effects and accidents
摘要:
我们调查的最优策略的存在性,以监测平均场系统的代理管理的道德风险下的风险项目的事故Lévy过程放大的法律项目。我们提供了一个通用的方法来找到一个平均场均衡的代理商和最优的补偿政策下的一般,充分和必要的假设所有的参数。我们形式化的问题作为一个双层优化的概率版本的平均场游戏,可以减少到一个控制的McKean-Vlasov跳跃。我们将我们的研究结果应用到一个最优的能源需求响应问题与一群消费者停电/短缺时,能源消耗的变化是太高的内源性或外源性菌株。在这个例子中,我们得到了平均场博弈和带跳的McKean-Vlasov方程的显式解
英文摘要:
We investigate the existence of an optimal policy to monitor a mean field systems of agents managing a risky project under moral hazard with accidents modeled by Lévy processes magnified by the law of the project. We provide a general method to find both a mean field equilibrium for the agents and the optimal compensation policy under general, sufficient and necessary assumptions on all the parameters. We formalize the problem as a bilevel optimization with the probabilistic version of a mean field games which can be reduced to a controlled McKean-Vlasov SDE with jumps. We apply our results to an optimal energy demand-response problem with a crowd of consumers subjected to power cut/shortage when the variability of the energy consumption is too high under endogenous or exogenous strains. In this example, we get explicit solution to the mean field game and to the McKean-Vlasov equation with jumps
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