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arXiv 1202.2076math.PRq-fin.RM
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银行监管激励的数学处理

A mathematical treatment of bank monitoring incentives

Henri Pagès, Dylan Possamaï

摘要:

在本文中,我们对[17]中引入的具有道德风险的委托人/代理人模型进行了分析,其中竞争性投资者和不耐烦的银行之间的最优契约监控着一个服从马尔可夫传染的长期贷款池。我们在这里提供了一个全面的数学公式的模型,并显示使用鞅参数的精神Sannikov [18]如何与投资者面临的隐式约束的最大化问题可以减少到一个经典的随机控制问题。该方法的优点是避免了[6]中描述的基于前向-后向随机微分方程的更一般的技术,并且导致了Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman方程的简单递归系统。我们提供了一个解决方案,我们的问题的验证参数,并给出一个明确的描述的价值函数和最优的合同。最后,我们研究了银行不再不耐烦的极限情况。

英文摘要:

In this paper, we take up the analysis of a principal/agent model with moral hazard introduced in [17], with optimal contracting between competitive investors and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to Markovian contagion. We provide here a comprehensive mathematical formulation of the model and show using martingale arguments in the spirit of Sannikov [18] how the maximization problem with implicit constraints faced by investors can be reduced to a classical stochastic control problem. The approach has the advantage of avoiding the more general techniques based on forward-backward stochastic differential equations described in [6] and leads to a simple recursive system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. We provide a solution to our problem by a verification argument and give an explicit description of both the value function and the optimal contract. Finally, we study the limit case where the bank is no longer impatient.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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