Moral Hazard设定下信息的价值
The value of the information in the Moral Hazard setting
AI总结:
本文研究了Moral Hazard设定下委托人评估缺失信息价值的问题,通过求解first-best和second-best两种情形下的随机控制与最优停时问题,并利用两者价值函数之差计算了观测代理人努力的信息价值。
摘要:
本文研究了当委托人与努力不可观测的代理人订立激励合同时,评估委托人所缺失信息的问题。委托人(“她”)向代理人(“他”)支付连续租金,而代理人给出以其努力为特征的最优响应,直至委托人决定终止合同并向代理人提供补偿的终止日期。项目的产出过程是由布朗运动驱动的扩散过程,其漂移项受代理人努力的影响。论文第一部分研究了委托人和代理人共享相同信息时的最优随机控制问题。这种被称为first-best(第一最优)情形的情况,通过求解拉格朗日问题得以解决。在第二部分,委托人观测产出过程,但可能无法分别观测漂移项和布朗运动。这种情况被称为second-best(第二最优)情形。我们推导了代理人的最优响应,随后在固定概率测度以及由布朗运动生成的流(大于由产出过程生成的流,后者对应委托人可用的信息)上,求解了委托人的混合最优停时/随机控制问题。在某些正则性条件下,通过求解相关的Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Variational Inequality(哈密顿-雅可比-贝尔曼变分不等式)来刻画委托人价值函数。在最优状态下,我们证明这两个流是重合的。最后,我们计算了委托人通过观测代理人努力所获得的信息价值。其定义为first-best和second-best情形下委托人价值函数之差。
英文摘要:
This article studies the problem of evaluating the information that a Principal lacks when establishing an incentive contract with an Agent whose effort is not observable. The Principal ("she") pays a continuous rent to the Agent ("he"), while the latter gives a best response characterized by his effort, until a terminal date decided by the Principal when she stops the contract and gives compensation to the Agent. The output process of the project is a diffusion process driven by a Brownian motion whose drift is impacted by the Agent's effort. The first part of the paper investigates the optimal stochastic control problem when the Principal and the Agent share the same information. This situation, known as the first-best case, is solved by tackling the Lagrangian problem. In the second part, the Principal observes the output process but she may not observe the drift and the Brownian motion separately. This situation is known as the second-best case. We derive the best response of the Agent, then we solve the mixed optimal stopping/stochastic control problem of the Principal under a fixed probability and on the filtration generated by the Brownian motion, which is larger than the one generated by the output process (that corresponds to the information available for the Principal). Under some regularity conditions, the Principal value function is characterized by solving the associated Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Variational Inequality. At the optimum, we prove that the two filtrations coincide. Finally, we compute the value of the information for the Principal provided by the observation of the Agent's effort. It is defined as the difference between the principal value function in the first-best and second-best cases.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。