福利经济学中的道德风险:规划者建议管理员工行为的优势
Moral hazard in welfare economics: on the advantage of Planner's advices to manage employees' actions
AI总结:
本文研究了合同理论中的道德风险问题,引入了外生规划者来管理雇主雇佣的代理人的行为。通过标量化方法解决代理人帕累托最优问题,并确定雇主的最佳报酬方案。通过线性二次模型比较了规划者参与与传统第二最佳情况下的结果。
摘要:
在本文中,我们通过引入外生规划者来研究合同理论中的道德风险问题,该规划者负责管理雇主雇佣的代理人的行为。我们提供了确保代理人使用标量化方法解决多目标优化问题的条件,并通过寻找给代理人的最优报酬来解决雇主的问题。我们通过线性二次模型来说明我们的研究,通过比较在雇主/多代理人问题中加入规划者与传统第二最佳情况下的结果。特别地,在这个例子中,我们给出了确保帕累托最优是纳什均衡的必要和充分条件,并证明在某些情况下雇主会利用规划者的行动。
英文摘要:
In this paper, we study moral hazard problems in contract theory by adding an exogenous Planner to manage the actions of Agents hired by a Principal. We provide conditions ensuring that Pareto optima exist for the Agents using the scalarization method associated with the multi-objective optimization problem and we solve the problem of the Principal by finding optimal remunerations given to the Agents. We illustrate our study with a linear-quadratic model by comparing the results obtained when we add a Planner in the Principal/multi-Agents problem with the results obtained in the classical second-best case. More particularly in this example, we give necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that Pareto optima are Nash equilibria and we prove that the Principal takes the benefit of the action of the Planner in some cases
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。