考虑道德风险的公私合作最优契约
Optimal Contract with Moral Hazard for Public Private Partnerships
摘要:
公私伙伴关系(PPP)是公共实体和财团之间的合同,其中公共外包设备(医院,大学,监狱.)的建设和维护。这份契约的一个缺点是,公众可能无法看到财团的努力,只能看到财团对社会福利的影响。我们的目标是在这种情况下,双方之间的信息不对称的PPP的最优合同的特点。这导致了一个部分信息下的随机控制,它也涉及到道德风险的委托代理问题。考虑到更广泛的信息,为公众和使用鞅参数的精神Sannikov,最优化问题可以减少到一个标准的随机控制问题,这是数值求解。然后,我们证明了最优的合同,财团的努力是明确的特点。特别是,它表明,最佳租金是不是一个线性函数的努力,相反的一些模型的经济文献的公私伙伴关系合同。
英文摘要:
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a contract between a public entity and a consortium, in which the public outsources the construction and the maintenance of an equipment (hospital, university, prison...). One drawback of this contract is that the public may not be able to observe the effort of the consortium but only its impact on the social welfare of the project. We aim to characterize the optimal contract for a PPP in this setting of asymmetric information between the two parties. This leads to a stochastic control under partial information and it is also related to principal-agent problems with moral hazard. Considering a wider set of information for the public and using martingale arguments in the spirit of Sannikov, the optimization problem can be reduced to a standard stochastic control problem, that is solved numerically. We then prove that for the optimal contract, the effort of the consortium is explicitly characterized. In particular, it is shown that the optimal rent is not a linear function of the effort, contrary to some models of the economic literature on PPP contracts.
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