Stackelberg 平均场博弈:具有多个竞争 Agent 的 Principal 问题的收敛性与存在性结果
Stackelberg Mean Field Games: convergence and existence results to the problem of Principal with multiple Agents in competition
AI总结:
本文研究道德风险下多个竞争Agent的Principal问题,利用平均场博弈理论构建极限问题,证明当Agent数量趋于无穷时收敛,并发现提供经验分布映射的合同近似最优。
摘要:
在道德风险情境下,本文研究了当 Agent 数量 n 趋于无穷大时,具有 n 个 Agent 的 Principal 问题。Agent 之间存在竞争,表现为他们通过纳什均衡准则优化其效用函数。每个 Agent 由 Principal 提供一份合同,该合同分为两部分:一部分是马尔可夫部分,涉及 Agent 的状态/产出;另一部分是非马尔可夫部分,涉及所有其他 Agent 的状态/产出。Agent 之间存在相互作用。这些相互作用通过共同噪声、状态/产出和控制的经验分布以及合同来表征,且合同不被假定为经验分布的映射。借助平均场博弈理论,我们能够构建一个涉及具有代表性 Agent 的 Principal 的适当极限问题。我们首先在极限问题中求解 Principal 和代表性 Agent 的问题。然后,当 n 趋于无穷大时,我们证明具有 n 个 Agent 的 Principal 问题收敛到具有代表性 Agent 的 Principal 的极限问题。一个显著的结果是,尽管允许一般类型的合同,但 Principal 向 n 个 Agent 提供作为 Agent 状态/产出和控制经验分布映射的合同,近似是最优的。
英文摘要:
In a situation of moral hazard, this paper investigates the problem of Principal with $n$ Agents when the number of Agents $n$ goes to infinity. There is competition between the Agents expressed by the fact that they optimize their utility functions through a Nash equilibrium criterion. Each Agent is offered by the Principal a contract which is divided into a Markovian part involving the state/production of the Agent and a non--Markovian part involving the states/productions of all the other Agents. The Agents are in interactions. These interactions are characterized by common noise, the empirical distribution of states/productions and controls, and the contract which is not assumed to be a map of the empirical distribution. By the help of the mean field games theory, we are able to formulate an appropriate $limit$ problem involving a Principal with a $representative$ Agent. We start by solving the problem of both the Principal and the $representative$ Agent in this $limit$ problem. Then, when $n$ goes to infinity, we show that the problem of Principal with $n$ Agents converges to the $limit$ problem of Principal with a $representative$ Agent. A notable result is that, despite allowing a general type of contracts, it is approximately optimal for the Principal to offer contracts to the $n$ Agents that are maps of the empirical distribution of states/productions and controls of the Agents.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。