均场竞争
A Mean Field Competition
AI总结:
本文研究基于排名的均场游戏,提出可解的泊松模型以描述给定奖励方案下的最优努力,并探讨设计最优奖励方案的委托-代理问题,发现一种显式方案可最小化达到目标的人口比例的时间。
摘要:
本文引入基于排名的均场游戏:竞争者优化其努力以达成目标,根据完成时间进行排名,并根据相对名次获得报酬。首先,我们提出一个可解的泊松模型,可以描述给定报酬方案下的最优努力。其次,我们研究设计最优报酬方案的委托-代理问题。发现一种显式方案可最小化达到目标的人口比例所需的时间。
英文摘要:
We introduce a mean field game with rank-based reward: competing agents optimize their effort to achieve a goal, are ranked according to their completion time, and paid a reward based on their relative rank. First, we propose a tractable Poissonian model in which we can describe the optimal effort for a given reward scheme. Second, we study the principal--agent problem of designing an optimal reward scheme. A surprising, explicit design is found to minimize the time until a given fraction of the population has reached the goal.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。