arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2006.14472cs.GTecon.THmath.OC
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团队平均场竞赛

Teamwise Mean Field Competitions

Xiang Yu, Yuchong Zhang, Zhou Zhou

摘要:

研究了具有等级奖励的多个团队竞争问题。在每个规模较大的团队中,我们考虑了一个平均场贡献博弈,其中每个团队成员都对一个共同的泊松项目过程的跳跃强度做出贡献;在所有团队中,一个平均场竞争博弈被制定在完成时间的排名上,即泊松项目过程的跳跃时间,并且每个团队的奖励是根据其排名支付的。在团队竞争博弈层,研究了当团队规模由以下因素决定时的三个最优化问题:(i)团队管理者;(ii)中心计划者;(iii)团队成员作为伙伴的投票。我们提出了一个相对的绩效标准,每个团队成员分享团队的奖励,并制定了一些特殊情况下的平均场对策的平均场对策,这是新的文献。在所有具有齐次参数的问题中,每个工人的均衡控制和均衡或最优团队规模可以以显式的方式计算,使我们能够分析研究一些模型参数的影响,并讨论其经济含义。通过两个算例说明了不同团队规模决策的参数依赖性和比较。

英文摘要:

This paper studies competitions with rank-based reward among a large number of teams. Within each sizable team, we consider a mean-field contribution game in which each team member contributes to the jump intensity of a common Poisson project process; across all teams, a mean field competition game is formulated on the rank of the completion time, namely the jump time of Poisson project process, and the reward to each team is paid based on its ranking. On the layer of teamwise competition game, three optimization problems are introduced when the team size is determined by: (i) the team manager; (ii) the central planner; (iii) the team members' voting as partnership. We propose a relative performance criteria for each team member to share the team's reward and formulate some special cases of mean field games of mean field games, which are new to the literature. In all problems with homogeneous parameters, the equilibrium control of each worker and the equilibrium or optimal team size can be computed in an explicit manner, allowing us to analytically examine the impacts of some model parameters and discuss their economic implications. Two numerical examples are also presented to illustrate the parameter dependence and comparison between different team size decision making.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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