arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1912.01952math.OCq-fin.GN
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一种用于加密货币挖掘的平均场博弈模型

A Mean Field Games Model for Cryptocurrency Mining

Zongxi Li, A. Max Reppen, Ronnie Sircar

摘要:

我们提出了一个平均场对策模型来研究在类似比特币的加密货币中,奖励和计算能力的集中化是如何发生的。矿工们通过提高计算能力来竞争挖矿奖励。这导致了一种新的平均场游戏的跳跃强度控制,我们明确解决矿工最大化指数效用,并处理数值的情况下,矿工与电力公用事业。我们发现,他们的初始财富分配的异质性导致更大的不平衡的奖励分配,并随着时间的推移增加的财富异质性,或“富人更富”的效果。这种集中现象因更高的比特币挖矿奖励而加剧,并因竞争而减少。此外,具有成本优势(例如获得更便宜的电力)的挖矿者在平衡时贡献了大量的计算能力,不受效率较低的矿工的竞争影响。因此,成本效率也可能导致加密货币矿工中出现的集中化类型。

英文摘要:

We propose a mean field game model to study the question of how centralization of reward and computational power occur in Bitcoin-like cryptocurrencies. Miners compete against each other for mining rewards by increasing their computational power. This leads to a novel mean field game of jump intensity control, which we solve explicitly for miners maximizing exponential utility, and handle numerically in the case of miners with power utilities. We show that the heterogeneity of their initial wealth distribution leads to greater imbalance of the reward distribution, and increased wealth heterogeneity over time, or a "rich get richer" effect. This concentration phenomenon is aggravated by a higher bitcoin mining reward, and reduced by competition. Additionally, an advantaged miner with cost advantages such as access to cheaper electricity, contributes a significant amount of computational power in equilibrium, unaffected by competition from less efficient miners. Hence, cost efficiency can also result in the type of centralization seen among miners of cryptocurrencies.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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