平均场博弈中的合作、竞争与公共池资源
Cooperation, Competition, and Common Pool Resources in Mean Field Games
AI总结:
本文针对平均场博弈在公共池资源问题中无法解释公地悲剧未出现这一现象,提出在个体和群体层面混合合作与非合作行为的两种模型,证明其可为有限智能体博弈提供近似均衡控制,并通过鱼类资源管理实例展示合作水平对公共池资源的影响。
摘要:
平均场博弈(MFGs)已被引入用于研究大规模自利智能体群体中的纳什均衡。然而,当应用于公共池资源(CPR)博弈时,平均场博弈均衡会导致所谓的“公地悲剧”(TOTC)。实证研究表明,在许多情形下,公地悲剧并未出现,这提示标准平均场博弈模型无法解释智能体在公共池资源博弈中的行为。在本工作中,我们研究了两种模型,它们在个体层面或群体层面引入了合作与非合作行为的混合。在定义这些模型之后,我们以前向-后向随机微分方程的形式研究了最优性条件,并证明了平均场模型为相应的有限智能体博弈提供了近似均衡控制。随后,我们展示了一个在鱼类资源管理模型中的应用,该模型的解可以通过求解常微分方程组来计算,并且我们证明了该方程组具有唯一解。数值结果说明了在个体层面和群体层面的合作水平对公共池资源的影响。
英文摘要:
Mean field games (MFGs) have been introduced to study Nash equilibria in very large population of self-interested agents. However, when applied to common pool resource (CPR) games, MFG equilibria lead to the so-called tragedy of the commons (TOTC). Empirical studies have shown that in many situations, TOTC does not materialize which hints at the fact that standard MFG models cannot explain the behavior of agents in CPR games. In this work, we study two models which incorporate a mix of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors, either at the individual level or the population level. After defining these models, we study optimality conditions in the form of forward-backward stochastic differential equations and we prove that the mean field models provide approximate equilibria controls for corresponding finite-agent games. We then show an application to a model of fish stock management, for which the solution can be computed by solving systems of ordinary differential equations, which we prove to have a unique solution. Numerical results illustrate the impact of the level of cooperation at the individual and the population levels on the CPR.
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