基于排名的主从奖励机制:应用于节能领域
A Rank-Based Reward between a Principal and a Field of Agents: Application to Energy Savings
AI总结:
本文研究了主方设计奖励函数以激励异质代理群体的问题,通过排名机制引发竞争,并在均场交互极限下证明了均衡分布的存在性和唯一性,提出了一种收敛的数值方法,并通过法国节能证书市场案例验证了排名系统在实现节能目标中的有效性。
摘要:
本文考虑了主方设计奖励函数以激励异质代理群体的问题,通过排名机制引发竞争,并在均场交互极限下证明了均衡分布的存在性和唯一性,对于给定的奖励函数,可以找到显式表示。首先在同质设定下,通过凸化问题特性化最优奖励函数并解释其行为。随后证明该特性化仍适用于异质群体的子类。对于一般情况,提出了一种收敛的数值方法,充分利用均场均衡的特性化。基于现实数据开发了一个与法国节能证书市场相关的案例研究,展示了排名系统在实现监管规定的节能目标中的有效性。
英文摘要:
In this paper, we consider the problem of a Principal aiming at designing a reward function for a population of heterogeneous agents. We construct an incentive based on the ranking of the agents, so that a competition among the latter is initiated. We place ourselves in the limit setting of mean-field type interactions and prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium distribution for a given reward, for which we can find an explicit representation. Focusing first on the homogeneous setting, we characterize the optimal reward function using a convex reformulation of the problem and provide an interpretation of its behaviour. We then show that this characterization still holds for a sub-class of heterogeneous populations. For the general case, we propose a convergent numerical method which fully exploits the characterization of the mean-field equilibrium. We develop a case study related to the French market of Energy Saving Certificates based on the use of realistic data, which shows that the ranking system allows to achieve the sobriety target imposed by the regulation.
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