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arXiv 2103.04219math.OCecon.TH
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平均场与奇点的较量

Mean Field Contest with Singularity

Marcel Nutz, Yuchong Zhang

摘要:

我们制定了一个平均场游戏,每个球员停止一个私人观察到的布朗运动吸收。玩家根据他们的停止水平进行排名,并根据他们的相对排名获得奖励。有一个唯一的平均场均衡,它被证明是相关的$n$玩家游戏的极限。相反,平均场策略对任何连续的报酬函数都诱导出$n$ -参与者$\varepsilon$ -纳什均衡,但对不连续的回报函数则不然。在第二部分中,我们研究了一个主要的问题,谁可以选择如何分配奖励预算的行列,旨在最大限度地提高性能的中位数球员。最优的奖励设计(合同)被发现在封闭的形式,补充仅部分结果可在$n$的情况下。然后,我们分析了质量的平均场设计时,作为一个代理的优化器在$n$的玩家游戏。令人惊讶的是,随着$n$的增长,质量急剧恶化。我们解释这与诱导$n$ -玩家平衡分布的渐近奇异性。

英文摘要:

We formulate a mean field game where each player stops a privately observed Brownian motion with absorption. Players are ranked according to their level of stopping and rewarded as a function of their relative rank. There is a unique mean field equilibrium and it is shown to be the limit of associated $n$-player games. Conversely, the mean field strategy induces $n$-player $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibria for any continuous reward function -- but not for discontinuous ones. In a second part, we study the problem of a principal who can choose how to distribute a reward budget over the ranks and aims to maximize the performance of the median player. The optimal reward design (contract) is found in closed form, complementing the merely partial results available in the $n$-player case. We then analyze the quality of the mean field design when used as a proxy for the optimizer in the $n$-player game. Surprisingly, the quality deteriorates dramatically as $n$ grows. We explain this with an asymptotic singularity in the induced $n$-player equilibrium distributions.

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