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arXiv 2102.03417math.OCecon.GNq-fin.ECq-fin.MF
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冒险竞赛中的奖励设计

Reward Design in Risk-Taking Contests

Marcel Nutz, Yuchong Zhang

摘要:

遵循Seel和Strack的冒险模型,$n$玩家决定何时停止私下观察到的漂移和吸收为零的布朗运动。然后,他们根据他们的停止水平进行排名,并获得与排名相关的奖励。我们研究的问题,主要是谁的目的是诱导一个理想的均衡性能的球员,通过选择有多少奖励归因于每个等级。具体来说,我们确定最佳的奖励计划感兴趣的校长在平均性能和性能在给定的排名。虽然前者可以与洛伦兹意义上的奖励不平等有关,但后者可以有一个令人惊讶的形状。

英文摘要:

Following the risk-taking model of Seel and Strack, $n$ players decide when to stop privately observed Brownian motions with drift and absorption at zero. They are then ranked according to their level of stopping and paid a rank-dependent reward. We study the problem of a principal who aims to induce a desirable equilibrium performance of the players by choosing how much reward is attributed to each rank. Specifically, we determine optimal reward schemes for principals interested in the average performance and the performance at a given rank. While the former can be related to reward inequality in the Lorenz sense, the latter can have a surprising shape.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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