无沟通共同代理的委托代理问题
Principal-Agent Problem with Common Agency without Communication
摘要:
本文考虑了多个委托人雇用一个共同代理人的契约理论问题,并在连续时间的条件下研究了该模型。我们证明了最优合同应该满足一些平衡条件,并且我们将委托人的优化问题简化为耦合的Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB)方程系统。我们提供的条件,确保风险中性的校长,耦合HJB方程的系统承认一个解决方案。此外,我们应用我们的研究在一个更具体的线性二次模型,两个相互作用的委托人雇用一个共同的代理。在这个连续时间模型中,我们扩展了Bernheim和Whisper(1986)的结果,其中作者比较了非合作委托人模型和聚合模型中代理人的最优努力,表明这两种优化仅在第一个最佳情况下一致。我们还研究了最优努力和最优报酬对偏好参数的敏感性以及项目之间的相关性。
英文摘要:
In this paper, we consider a problem of contract theory in which several Principals hire a common Agent and we study the model in the continuous time setting. We show that optimal contracts should satisfy some equilibrium conditions and we reduce the optimisation problem of the Principals to a system of coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. We provide conditions ensuring that for risk-neutral Principals, the system of coupled HJB equations admits a solution. Further, we apply our study in a more specific linear-quadratic model where two interacting Principals hire one common Agent. In this continuous time model, we extend the result of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) in which the authors compare the optimal effort of the Agent in a non-cooperative Principals model and that in the aggregate model, by showing that these two optimisations coincide only in the first best case. We also study the sensibility of the optimal effort and the optimal remunerations with respect to appetence parameters and the correlation between the projects.
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