arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2407.09471math.OCecon.GNmath.PRq-fin.EC
收藏

一种求解带波动率控制的委托-代理问题的新方法

A new approach to principal-agent problems with volatility control

Alessandro Chiusolo, Emma Hubert

AI总结:

针对带波动率控制的连续时间委托-代理问题,提出一种依托BSDEs理论的替代构造方法,证明其解与原问题等价,无需二阶BSDE即可验证合约最优性,简化了求解过程。

摘要:

Cvitanić、Possamaï和Touzi(2018)[9]的近期研究通过动态规划与二阶倒向随机微分方程(second-order backward stochastic differential equations, BSDEs),提出了一种求解连续时间委托-代理问题的通用方法。本文提出了该委托-代理问题的一种替代构造形式,仅需依托BSDEs理论即可简便求解。这一重构思路深受[9]中一项重要论断的启发:若委托人可连续观测产出过程,她就能逐路径计算其二次变差。在[9]中,这一信息被应用于合约设计,而我们的重构则假设委托人能够以“最优(first-best)”方式直接控制该过程。针对这一替代问题的求解思路,实际上遵循了连续时间委托-代理问题研究领域中所谓的“Sannikov技巧”的路线,该技巧最早由Sannikov(2008)[28]提出。我们随后证明,这一“最优”构造形式的解与原问题的解完全等价。更确切地说,借助[9]中提出的“惩罚合约(penalisation contracts)”形式,我们阐明了即便委托人无法直接控制二次变差,这一“最优”情形仍可实现。此外,我们无需依托2BSDEs理论来证明此类合约的最优性,因为只需证明“最优”情形能够达成,即可确保其最优性。我们认为,这种求解带波动率控制的连续时间委托-代理问题的更直接方法,将推动这类问题在众多领域的传播,并助力其向更复杂问题的拓展。

英文摘要:

The recent work by Cvitanić, Possamaï, and Touzi (2018) [9] presents a general approach for continuous-time principal-agent problems, through dynamic programming and second-order backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). In this paper, we provide an alternative formulation of the principal-agent problem, which can be solved simply by relying on the theory of BSDEs. This reformulation is strongly inspired by an important remark in [9], namely that if the principal observes the output process in continuous-time, she can compute its quadratic variation pathwise. While in [9], this information is used in the contract, our reformulation consists in assuming that the principal could directly control this process, in a `first-best' fashion. The resolution approach for this alternative problem actually follows the line of the so-called `Sannikov's trick' in the literature on continuous-time principal-agent problems, as originally introduced by Sannikov (2008) [28]. We then show that the solution to this `first-best' formulation is identical to the solution of the original problem. More precisely, using the contract form introduced in [9] as `penalisation contracts', we highlight that this `first-best' scenario can be achieved even if the principal cannot directly control the quadratic variation. Nevertheless, we do not have to rely on the theory of 2BSDEs to prove that such contracts are optimal, as their optimality is ensured by showing that the `first-best' scenario is achieved. We believe that this more straightforward approach to solve continuous-time principal-agent problems with volatility control will facilitate the dissemination of these problems across many fields, and its extension to even more intricate problems.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑