$C^{1,1}$ 正则性对于委托-代理问题
$C^{1,1}$ regularity for principal-agent problems
AI总结:
本文证明了一类委托-代理问题中间接效用的内部 $C^{1,1}$ 正则性,通过构造比较函数将解夹在抛物线之间,并推广了 Caffarelli-Lions 的结果到拟线性效益函数,且给出例子说明该正则性最优。
摘要:
我们证明了间接效用的内部 $C^{1,1}$ 正则性,这些间接效用解决了一类最初由 Figalli、Kim 和 McCann 考虑的委托-代理问题。我们的方法基于构造一个合适的比较函数,该函数本质上允许将解夹在抛物线之间。此证明的原始思想源于 Caffarelli 和 Lions 早期未发表的结果,该结果针对双线性偏好,我们将其扩展到一般的拟线性效益函数。我们给出了一个简单例子,表明 $C^{1,1}$ 正则性是最优的。
英文摘要:
We prove the interior $C^{1,1}$ regularity of the indirect utilities which solve a subclass of principal-agent problems originally considered by Figalli, Kim, and McCann. Our approach is based on construction of a suitable comparison function which, essentially, allows one to pinch the solution between parabolas. The original ideas for this proof arise from an earlier, unpublished, result of Caffarelli and Lions for bilinear preferences which we extend here to general quasilinear benefit functions. We give a simple example which shows the $C^{1,1}$ regularity is optimal.
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