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arXiv 2411.07488cs.GT
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通过说服出售物品

Selling an Item through Persuasion

Zhikang Fan, Weiran Shen

AI总结:

研究垄断卖家通过设计信息揭示实验和销售机制以最大化收入的问题,推导出包含实验与支付函数的闭式最优解,并证明结果可扩展至更广泛的分布与估值函数。

摘要:

垄断卖家旨在将不可分割的物品出售给多个潜在买家。每个买家的估值取决于其私人类型和物品质量。卖家可以观察到质量,但买家不知道。该质量信息对买家有价值,因此卖家在决定将物品出售给谁以及以何种价格出售之前,策略性地设计揭示质量信息的实验是有益的。我们研究设计收入最大化机制的问题,该机制允许卖家披露信息并出售物品。首先,我们将显示原理重新应用于我们的设定,表明卖家可以不失一般性地专注于单轮机制。然后,我们将机制设计问题表述为优化问题,并推导出闭式最优解。最优机制包括一组实验和支付函数。在引出买家类型后,最优机制要求买家购买并相应地设定价格。最优信息结构涉及对质量空间进行划分。此外,我们表明我们的结果可以扩展到更广泛的分布类和估值函数。

英文摘要:

A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can observe the quality but it is unknown to buyers. This quality information is valuable to buyers, so it is beneficial for the seller to strategically design experiments that reveal information about the quality before deciding to sell the item to whom and at what price. We study the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing mechanism that allows the seller to disclose information and sell the item. First, we recast the revelation principle to our setting, showing that the seller can focus on one-round mechanisms without loss of generality. We then formulate the mechanism design problem as an optimization problem and derive the optimal solution in closed form. The optimal mechanism includes a set of experiments and payment functions. After eliciting buyers' types, the optimal mechanism asks a buyer to buy and sets a price accordingly. The optimal information structure involves partitioning the quality space. Additionally, we show that our results can be extended to a broader class of distributions and valuation functions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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