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arXiv 1902.10008cs.GTcs.CRcs.CY
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销售具有负外部性的单一商品

Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities

Tithi Chattopadhyay, Nick Feamster, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Danny Yuxing Huang, S. Matthew Weinberg

AI总结:

本文研究具有负外部性的单一商品销售监管问题,建立模型分析监管政策效率,证明同质市场中仅需监管支付或生产之一即可达到最优,任意市场中亦存在仅监管一方面的近似最优政策。

摘要:

我们考虑对具有负外部性的产品进行监管的问题,这种外部性影响的是既非买方也非卖方的第三方,但买方和卖方都可以采取措施来减轻外部性。需要牢记的激励性例子是物联网(IoT)设备的销售,其中许多设备历史上曾被攻破用于DDoS攻击,干扰了诸如Twitter等互联网范围的服务。买方(即消费者)和卖方(即物联网制造商)均未因攻击而遭受损失,但双方都有能力付出努力来保护其设备。我们考虑一个监管者,其可以通过罚款(若设备被攻破)或直接调控市场价格来监管支付,或者通过强制性安全要求直接监管产品。两种监管都有成本——实施安全要求会增加生产成本,而罚款的存在会降低消费者价值——从而减少卖方的利润。本文的重点是理解各种监管政策的效率。也就是说,如果政策A比政策B更成功地最小化负外部性,而两者同等程度地降低卖方利润,则政策A比政策B更有效率。我们开发了一个简单模型来刻画监管政策对买方行为的影响。在该模型中,我们证明对于同质市场——其中买方遵循安全实践的能力始终很高或始终很低——最优(在给定利润约束下最小化外部性)监管政策只需监管支付或生产中的一项。相比之下,在任意市场中,我们证明虽然最优政策可能需要同时监管两个方面,但总存在一个近似最优的政策只需监管其中一个方面。

英文摘要:

We consider the problem of regulating products with negative externalities to a third party that is neither the buyer nor the seller, but where both the buyer and seller can take steps to mitigate the externality. The motivating example to have in mind is the sale of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, many of which have historically been compromised for DDoS attacks that disrupted Internet-wide services such as Twitter. Neither the buyer (i.e., consumers) nor seller (i.e., IoT manufacturers) was known to suffer from the attack, but both have the power to expend effort to secure their devices. We consider a regulator who regulates payments (via fines if the device is compromised, or market prices directly), or the product directly via mandatory security requirements. Both regulations come at a cost---implementing security requirements increases production costs, and the existence of fines decreases consumers' values---thereby reducing the seller's profits. The focus of this paper is to understand the \emph{efficiency} of various regulatory policies. That is, policy A is more efficient than policy B if A more successfully minimizes negatives externalities, while both A and B reduce seller's profits equally. We develop a simple model to capture the impact of regulatory policies on a buyer's behavior. {In this model, we show that for \textit{homogeneous} markets---where the buyer's ability to follow security practices is always high or always low---the optimal (externality-minimizing for a given profit constraint) regulatory policy need regulate \emph{only} payments \emph{or} production.} In arbitrary markets, by contrast, we show that while the optimal policy may require regulating both aspects, there is always an approximately optimal policy which regulates just one.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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