arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1902.10315cs.GT
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买多机制并不比物品定价好多少

Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing

Shuchi Chawla, Yifeng Teng, Christos Tzamos

摘要:

多项目机制可以是非常复杂的,提供许多不同的捆绑给买家,甚至可以是随机的。这种复杂性被认为是必要的,因为随机和确定性机制之间的收入差距,或者确定性和简单机制之间的收入差距是巨大的,即使是对于加法估值。我们挑战这种传统的信念,表明这些大的差距只能发生在有限的情况下。在这种情况下,该机制向买家收取过高的捆绑费用,而以低得多的价格出售单个项目。可以说,这在许多情况下是不切实际的,因为买方可以将订单分成更小的部分,总体价格要低得多。我们的主要结果是,如果买方被允许购买尽可能多的(随机)捆绑,因为他喜欢,任何多项目机制的收入是最多O(logn)倍的收入可实现的项目定价,其中n是项目的数量。这在最一般的情况下也是成立的,即买家类型的分布任意相关,估值任意。我们还证明了这个结果在很强的意义上是紧的。任何亚指数描述复杂性的机制族都不能比对数近似更好地实现,即使是对最好的确定性机制,甚至是加法估值。相比之下,具有线性描述复杂性的项目定价与随机机制的约束相匹配。

英文摘要:

Multi-item mechanisms can be very complex offering many different bundles to the buyer that could even be randomized. Such complexity is thought to be necessary as the revenue gaps between randomized and deterministic mechanisms, or deterministic and simple mechanisms are huge even for additive valuations. We challenge this conventional belief by showing that these large gaps can only happen in restricted situations. These are situations where the mechanism overcharges a buyer for a bundle while selling individual items at much lower prices. Arguably this is impractical in many settings because the buyer can break his order into smaller pieces paying a much lower price overall. Our main result is that if the buyer is allowed to purchase as many (randomized) bundles as he pleases, the revenue of any multi-item mechanism is at most O(logn) times the revenue achievable by item pricing, where n is the number of items. This holds in the most general setting possible, with an arbitrarily correlated distribution of buyer types and arbitrary valuations. We also show that this result is tight in a very strong sense. Any family of mechanisms of subexponential description complexity cannot achieve better than logarithmic approximation even against the best deterministic mechanism and even for additive valuations. In contrast, item pricing that has linear description complexity matches this bound against randomized mechanisms.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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