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arXiv 1404.2832cs.GT
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销售多种商品的最优收益界

Bounding the Optimal Revenue of Selling Multiple Goods

Yiannis Giannakopoulos

摘要:

使用对偶理论的技术,我们推导出简单的,封闭形式的公式,用于约束的最优收入的垄断者出售许多异质商品,在这种情况下,买方的估价项目来i.i.d.从均匀分布和在其中它们遵循独立(但不一定相同)指数分布的情况下。我们应用这一点是为了在这两种设置中获得特定的性能保证,作为商品数量$m$的函数,用于Hart和Nisan [EC 2012]研究的简单确定性销售机制,即单独销售商品的机制和在单个捆绑包中提供所有商品的机制。我们还提出并研究了一个自然的随机机制的性能指数估值,称为比例。作为一个有趣的推论,对于指数分布也相同的特殊情况,我们可以得出,对于任何数量的商品,提供一个完整的捆绑商品是最优的销售机制。据我们所知,这是第一个此类结果:在任意数量商品的加法设置中找到收入最大化的拍卖。

英文摘要:

Using duality theory techniques we derive simple, closed-form formulas for bounding the optimal revenue of a monopolist selling many heterogeneous goods, in the case where the buyer's valuations for the items come i.i.d. from a uniform distribution and in the case where they follow independent (but not necessarily identical) exponential distributions. We apply this in order to get in both these settings specific performance guarantees, as functions of the number of items $m$, for the simple deterministic selling mechanisms studied by Hart and Nisan [EC 2012], namely the one that sells the items separately and the one that offers them all in a single bundle. We also propose and study the performance of a natural randomized mechanism for exponential valuations, called Proportional. As an interesting corollary, for the special case where the exponential distributions are also identical, we can derive that offering the goods in a single full bundle is the optimal selling mechanism for any number of items. To our knowledge, this is the first result of its kind: finding a revenue-maximizing auction in an additive setting with arbitrarily many goods.

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