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arXiv 1204.5519cs.GT
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信息销售的最优机制

Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Information

Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Renato Paes Leme

摘要:

由于用户数据在线市场的形成,信息的买卖正在以商业史上前所未有的规模进行。数据提供机构将用户信息出售给广告商,使他们能够更有效地将广告与观众相匹配。在本文中,我们研究了垄断数据提供商向买方出售信息的最优机制的设计,在一个模型中,双方都有(可能相关的)关于世界状态的私人信号,买方使用从卖方那里学到的信息,以及他自己的信号,来选择一个行动(例如,显示广告),其回报取决于世界的状态。我们提供了充分的条件,在此条件下,存在一个简单的单轮协议(即买方和卖方各自发送一条消息,并且有一笔资金转移的协议),以实现最佳收益。在这些情况下,我们提出了一个多项式时间算法,计算的最佳机制。有趣的是,我们表明,多轮的部分信息披露(交错支付给卖方)有时是必要的,以实现最佳的收入,如果买方被允许过早地中止他与卖方的互动。我们还证明了一些负面的结果,无法简单的机制出售的信息,以接近更复杂的在最坏的情况下。

英文摘要:

The buying and selling of information is taking place at a scale unprecedented in the history of commerce, thanks to the formation of online marketplaces for user data. Data providing agencies sell user information to advertisers to allow them to match ads to viewers more effectively. In this paper we study the design of optimal mechanisms for a monopolistic data provider to sell information to a buyer, in a model where both parties have (possibly correlated) private signals about a state of the world, and the buyer uses information learned from the seller, along with his own signal, to choose an action (e.g., displaying an ad) whose payoff depends on the state of the world. We provide sufficient conditions under which there is a simple one-round protocol (i.e. a protocol where the buyer and seller each sends a single message, and there is a single money transfer) achieving optimal revenue. In these cases we present a polynomial-time algorithm that computes the optimal mechanism. Intriguingly, we show that multiple rounds of partial information disclosure (interleaved by payment to the seller) are sometimes necessary to achieve optimal revenue if the buyer is allowed to abort his interaction with the seller prematurely. We also prove some negative results about the inability of simple mechanisms for selling information to approximate more complicated ones in the worst case.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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