向竞争对手出售数据(扩展摘要)
Selling Data to a Competitor (Extended Abstract)
AI总结:
本文研究向竞争对手出售数据的成本与收益,识别了利润最大化机制,并构建了能同时提升消费者福利与企业利润的帕累托改进机制,证明消费者选择加入可促使企业选择该机制。
摘要:
我们研究了向竞争对手出售数据的成本与收益。尽管出售所有消费者的数据可能会降低企业总利润,但存在其他出售机制——即仅出售部分消费者的数据——能够使两家企业都获益。我们识别了利润最大化的机制,并表明企业从中获得的收益是以牺牲消费者利益为代价的。随后,我们构建了帕累托改进机制,在该机制下,每个消费者的福利以及两家企业的利润均得到提升。最后,我们证明消费者选择加入(opt-in)可以作为一种工具,促使企业选择帕累托改进机制而非利润最大化机制。
英文摘要:
We study the costs and benefits of selling data to a competitor. Although selling all consumers' data may decrease total firm profits, there exist other selling mechanisms -- in which only some consumers' data is sold -- that render both firms better off. We identify the profit-maximizing mechanism, and show that the benefit to firms comes at a cost to consumers. We then construct Pareto-improving mechanisms, in which each consumers' welfare, as well as both firms' profits, increase. Finally, we show that consumer opt-in can serve as an instrument to induce firms to choose a Pareto-improving mechanism over a profit-maximizing one.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。