We consider a multi-dimensional screening problem of selling a product with multiple quality levels and design virtual value functions to derive conditions that imply optimality of only selling highest quality. A challenge of designing virtual values for multi-dimensional agents is that a mechanism that pointwise optimizes virtual values resulting from a general application of integration by parts is not incentive compatible, and no general methodology is known for selecting the right paths for integration by parts. We resolve this issue by first uniquely solving for paths that satisfy certain necessary conditions that the pointwise optimality of the mechanism imposes on virtual values, and then identifying distributions that ensure the resulting virtual surplus is indeed pointwise optimized by the mechanism. Our method of solving for virtual values is general, and as a second application we use it to derive conditions of optimality for selling only the grand bundle of items to an agent with additive preferences.
我们考虑Bergemann等人(2015)研究的三度价格歧视问题的推广,其中买方和卖方之间的中介可以设计市场细分,以最大化消费者剩余和卖方收入的任何线性组合。与Bergemann et al.(2015)不同,我们假设中介只知道买方价值的部分信息。我们考虑三种不同的信息模型,随着难度的增加。在第一个模型中,我们假设中介的信息允许他构建买方价值的概率分布。接下来,我们考虑样本复杂度模型,其中我们假设中介只看到来自此分布的样本。最后,我们考虑一个强盗在线学习模型,中介只能观察过去的购买决策的买家,而不是她的确切价值。对于这些模型中的每一个,我们提出了算法来计算最优或接近最优的市场细分。
Price-Discrimination Game for Distributed Resource Management in Federated Learning
School of Computer Science and Technology, China University of Mining and Technology(中国矿业大学计算机科学与技术学院);Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering, University College London(伦敦大学学院电子与电气工程系)