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arXiv 1404.1341cs.GT
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多维虚拟价值与二度价格歧视

Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second-degree Price Discrimination

Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline

摘要:

我们考虑了一个多维筛选问题,销售的产品具有多个质量水平和设计虚拟价值函数推导出的条件,意味着最优的只卖最高质量。为多维代理设计虚拟值的一个挑战是,逐点优化虚拟值的机制,从一般应用程序的集成部分是不激励兼容的,没有一般的方法是已知的选择正确的路径集成部分。我们解决这个问题,首先唯一解决路径,满足一定的必要条件,逐点最优的机制施加在虚拟值,然后确定分布,确保所产生的虚拟盈余确实是逐点优化的机制。我们的方法解决虚拟值是一般的,作为第二个应用程序,我们使用它来获得最优性条件,只出售大捆绑的项目与添加剂的偏好。

英文摘要:

We consider a multi-dimensional screening problem of selling a product with multiple quality levels and design virtual value functions to derive conditions that imply optimality of only selling highest quality. A challenge of designing virtual values for multi-dimensional agents is that a mechanism that pointwise optimizes virtual values resulting from a general application of integration by parts is not incentive compatible, and no general methodology is known for selecting the right paths for integration by parts. We resolve this issue by first uniquely solving for paths that satisfy certain necessary conditions that the pointwise optimality of the mechanism imposes on virtual values, and then identifying distributions that ensure the resulting virtual surplus is indeed pointwise optimized by the mechanism. Our method of solving for virtual values is general, and as a second application we use it to derive conditions of optimality for selling only the grand bundle of items to an agent with additive preferences.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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