arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1512.03485eess.SYcs.GTcs.SY
收藏

智能电网中能源交易的价格歧视:一种博弈论方法

Price discrimination for energy trading in smart grid: A game theoretic approach

Singapore University of Technology and Design(新加坡科技设计大学);National ICT Australia(澳大利亚国家ICT);Princeton University(普林斯顿大学)

Wayes Tushar, Chau Yuen, David Smith, H. Vincent Poor

AI总结:

本文研究了智能电网中基于博弈论的价格歧视技术,通过设计公平性准则最大化用户总收益并确保无嫉妒的能源交易市场。

摘要:

本文研究了智能电网中基于博弈论的价格歧视技术,通过设计公平性准则最大化用户总收益并确保无嫉妒的能源交易市场。

英文摘要:

Pricing schemes are an important smart grid feature to affect typical energy usage behavior of energy users (EUs). However, most existing schemes use the assumption that a buyer pays the same price per unit of energy to all suppliers at any particular time when energy is bought. By contrast, here a discriminate pricing technique using game theory is studied. A cake cutting game is investigated, in which participating EUs in a smart community decide on the price per unit of energy to charge a shared facility controller (SFC) in order to sell surplus energy. The focus is to study fairness criteria to maximize sum benefits to EUs and ensure an envy-free energy trading market. A benefit function is designed that leverages generation of discriminate pricing by each EU, according to the amount of surplus energy that an EU trades with the SFC and the EU's sensitivity to price. It is shown that the game possesses a socially optimal, and hence also Pareto optimal, solution. Further, an algorithm that can be implemented by each EU in a distributed manner to reach the optimal solution is proposed. Numerical case studies are given that demonstrate beneficial properties of the scheme.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑