隐私约束下价格歧视的局限性
The Limits of Price Discrimination Under Privacy Constraints
AI总结:
本文研究隐私机制约束下的三级价格歧视,通过将消费者—生产者效用集刻画为高维凸多面体到二维空间的线性映射,分析隐私水平对双方极值效用的影响及非单调性。
摘要:
我们研究了生产者向连续统的隐私敏感消费者销售产品的问题,其中生产者可以实施三级价格歧视,向不同的细分市场提供不同价格。我们考虑一种隐私机制,该机制通过概率性地掩盖每个细分市场来提供一定程度的保护。我们证明,由此产生的所有消费者—生产者效用集合构成一个凸多边形,并将其明确刻画为某个高维凸多面体到 $\mathbb{R}^2$ 的线性映射。这一刻画使我们能够研究隐私机制对生产者和消费者效用的影响。特别地,我们证明隐私约束总是会损害生产者,因为它同时降低了生产者可达到的最大效用和最小效用。从消费者角度看,尽管与非隐私情形相比,隐私机制确保了最小效用的提高,但有趣的是,它也可能降低最大效用。最后,我们证明提高隐私水平并不一定会加剧这些影响。例如,随着隐私水平提高,生产者的最大效用或消费者的最小效用可能表现出非单调行为。
英文摘要:
We study a producer's problem of selling a product to a continuum of privacy-conscious consumers, where the producer can implement third-degree price discrimination, offering different prices to different market segments. We consider a privacy mechanism that provides a degree of protection by probabilistically masking each market segment. We establish that the resultant set of all consumer-producer utilities forms a convex polygon, characterized explicitly as a linear mapping of a certain high-dimensional convex polytope into $\mathbb{R}^2$. This characterization enables us to investigate the impact of the privacy mechanism on both producer and consumer utilities. In particular, we establish that the privacy constraint always hurts the producer by reducing both the maximum and minimum utility achievable. From the consumer's perspective, although the privacy mechanism ensures an increase in the minimum utility compared to the non-private scenario, interestingly, it may reduce the maximum utility. Finally, we demonstrate that increasing the privacy level does not necessarily intensify these effects. For instance, the maximum utility for the producer or the minimum utility for the consumer may exhibit nonmonotonic behavior in response to an increase of the privacy level.
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