不可分的拟凹效用是容易的--在一个完全价格歧视市场模型中
Non-Separable, Quasiconcave Utilities are Easy -- in a Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model
摘要：
最近的研究结果，建立了证据的棘手性等限制性效用函数，如可加可分，分段线性和凹，在费雪和阿罗德布鲁市场模型，促使我们的问题是否没有捕捉到一些基本要素的真实市场，这似乎做了很好的工作，找到价格，保持平价之间的供应和需求。本文的主要观点是表明，即使是不可分离的，准凹效用函数可以有效地处理在一个适当选择的，虽然自然的，现实的和有用的，市场模型，我们的模型允许完美的价格歧视。我们的模型支持唯一的均衡价格和凹效用的限制，满足福利定理。
英文摘要：
Recent results, establishing evidence of intractability for such restrictive utility functions as additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave, under both Fisher and Arrow-Debreu market models, have prompted the question of whether we have failed to capture some essential elements of real markets, which seem to do a good job of finding prices that maintain parity between supply and demand. The main point of this paper is to show that even non-separable, quasiconcave utility functions can be handled efficiently in a suitably chosen, though natural, realistic and useful, market model; our model allows for perfect price discrimination. Our model supports unique equilibrium prices and, for the restriction to concave utilities, satisfies both welfare theorems.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
