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arXiv 1303.4199cs.GT
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通过优先信令实现网络非中立性

Network Non-Neutrality through Preferential Signaling

Manjesh Kumar Hanawal, Eitan Altman

摘要:

关于网络中立性的辩论中的一个核心问题是,是否应该允许或阻止互联网服务提供商(ISP)根据其来源对流量进行优惠待遇。这就提出了是否允许ISP与内容提供方(CP)签订排他性协议的问题。在本文中,我们考虑歧视在相反的方向。我们研究的影响,CP可以有几个竞争的ISP的利益,通过共享私人信息的需求,其内容。更确切地说,我们考虑的是竞争访问一个公共CP的ISP。每个ISP选择向其订阅者收取访问内容的价格。假设CP具有关于对其内容的需求的私有信息,并且具体地,具有关于对应于内容的逆需求函数的私有信息。竞争的ISP被认为只有这些功能的统计分布知识。在本文中,我们得出的模型研究的影响,CP可以对公用事业的ISP,有利于他们之一,完全揭示其私人信息。我们亦考虑到CP可就提供该等资料向互联网服务供应商收取费用的情况。我们提出了两种基于{ \em加权比例公平}的ISP和CP之间的支付机制。最后,我们通过引入一个称为{ \em部分议价价格}的性能度量,将这些机制产生的社会效用与最优社会效用进行了比较

英文摘要:

One of the central issues in the debate on network neutrality has been whether one should allow or prevent preferential treatment by an internet service provider (ISP) of traffic according to its origin. This raised the question of whether to allow an ISP to have exclusive agreement with a content provider (CP). In this paper we consider discrimination in the opposite direction. We study the impact that a CP can have on the benefits of several competing ISPs by sharing private information concerning the demand for its content. More precisely, we consider ISPs that compete over access to one common CP. Each ISP selects the price that it charges its subscribers for accessing the content. The CP is assumed to have private information about demand for its content, and in particular, about the inverse demand function corresponding to the content. The competing ISPs are assumed to have knowledge on only the statistical distribution of these functions. We derive in this paper models for studying the impact that the CP can have on the utilities of the ISPs by favoring one of them by exclusively revealing its private information. We also consider the case where CP can charge ISPs for providing such information. We propose two mechanisms based on {\em weighted proportional fairness} for payment between ISPs and CP. Finally, we compare the social utility resulting from these mechanisms with the optimal social utility by introducing a performance metric termed as {\em price of partial bargaining}

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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