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arXiv 2303.03077cs.GT
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社交网络中的分布式机制设计

Distributed Mechanism Design in Social Networks

Haoxin Liu, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao

摘要:

设计拍卖以激励买家通过他们的社会关系邀请新买家是机制设计的新趋势。挑战在于,买家是竞争对手,我们需要设计适当的激励措施,让他们相互邀请。对于销售单个项目,已经提出了许多有趣的机制。然而,所有的机制都要求卖方或第三方是值得信赖的,以执行这些机制。此外,该机制的所有者将在执行后知道网络的所有连接,这带来了潜在的隐私问题。因此,避免隐私问题的分布式机制在实践中更有吸引力。因此,在本文中,我们提出了社交网络中的第一个分布式机制,而不会向任何人透露买家的私人联系,它实现了完全的去中心化,不依赖于任何可信的第三方。此外,集中减少我们的机制也提供了一种新的方式来计算球员的贡献相比,现有的解决方案。

英文摘要:

Designing auctions to incentivize buyers to invite new buyers via their social connections is a new trend in mechanism design. The challenge is that buyers are competitors and we need to design proper incentives for them to invite each other. For selling a single item, many interesting mechanisms have been proposed. However, all the mechanisms require the seller or a third party to be trustworthy to execute the mechanisms. In addition, the owner of the mechanism will know all the connections of the network after the execution, which poses a potential privacy issue. Hence, distributed mechanisms to avoid the privacy issue are more appealing in practice. Therefore, in this paper, we propose the first distributed mechanism in social networks without revealing buyers' private connections to anyone, and it achieves complete decentralization that does not rely on any trustworthy third party. Moreover, the centralized reduction of our mechanism also offers a novel way to compute players' contributions compared to the existing solutions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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