一个Stackelberg游戏方法对社会意识的激励机制，为移动Crowdsensing（在线报告）
A Stackelberg Game Approach Towards Socially-Aware Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsensing (Online report)
摘要：
移动人群传感已显示出通过将传感任务分配给无处不在的移动用户来解决大规模数据传感问题的巨大潜力。移动用户如果能够获得满意的奖励，则将参与众测平台。在本文中，为了有效和高效地招募足够数量的移动用户，即，参与者，我们研究了一个最佳的激励机制的众感服务提供商。我们采用两阶段的Stackelberg博弈分析的移动用户的参与水平和最优的激励机制的众测服务提供商使用逆向归纳法。为了激励参与者，通过考虑潜在的移动社交领域的社会网络效应来设计激励。例如，在基于众测的道路交通信息共享应用中，如果更多的用户加入并共享他们的道路信息，则用户可以获得更好且准确的交通报告。我们推导了歧视性激励和统一激励机制的解析表达式。为了适应实际场景，我们进一步制定了贝叶斯Stackelberg游戏与不完全信息分析之间的互动crowdsensing服务提供商和移动用户，其中的社会结构信息（社会网络效应）是不确定的。通过识别移动用户的最佳响应策略，验证了贝叶斯Stackelberg均衡的存在性和唯一性。数值结果证实了这样一个事实，即网络效应极大地刺激更高的移动参与水平和更大的收入的众测服务提供商。此外，社会结构信息有助于众测服务提供商实现更大的收益。
英文摘要：
Mobile crowdsensing has shown a great potential to address large-scale data sensing problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive mobile users. The mobile users will participate in a crowdsensing platform if they can receive satisfactory reward. In this paper, to effectively and efficiently recruit sufficient number of mobile users, i.e., participants, we investigate an optimal incentive mechanism of a crowdsensing service provider. We apply a two-stage Stackelberg game to analyze the participation level of the mobile users and the optimal incentive mechanism of the crowdsensing service provider using backward induction. In order to motivate the participants, the incentive is designed by taking into account the social network effects from the underlying mobile social domain. For example, in a crowdsensing-based road traffic information sharing application, a user can get a better and accurate traffic report if more users join and share their road information. We derive the analytical expressions for the discriminatory incentive as well as the uniform incentive mechanisms. To fit into practical scenarios, we further formulate a Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information to analyze the interaction between the crowdsensing service provider and mobile users, where the social structure information (the social network effects) is uncertain. The existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best response strategies of the mobile users. Numerical results corroborate the fact that the network effects tremendously stimulate higher mobile participation level and greater revenue of the crowdsensing service provider. In addition, the social structure information helps the crowdsensing service provider to achieve greater revenue gain.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
