邻区电网需求侧管理的竞争性能源交易框架
Competitive Energy Trading Framework for Demand-side Management in Neighborhood Area Networks
摘要：
本文通过比较三种潜在的能量交易系统，研究了社区储能（CES）设备与消费者拥有的光伏（PV）系统集成的住宅小区区域网络的需求侧管理的可行性。我们认为一个完全竞争的CES运营商在一个非合作的Stackelberg游戏，一个仁慈的CES运营商，具有社会有利的法规与竞争的用户，和一个集中的合作CES运营商，最大限度地减少社区的总能源成本。前两个博弈论系统认为CES运营商首先通过设置价格信号和与电网交易能量来最大化其收入。然后，光伏电池板的用户玩一个非合作的重复博弈的行动后，CES运营商的交易与CES设备和电网的能量，以最大限度地减少能源成本。集中式CES运营商与用户合作，以最小化总社区能源成本，而无需适当的激励。CES运营商完全竞争的非合作Stackelberg博弈存在唯一的Stackelberg均衡，在该均衡点上CES运营商收益最大化，用户获得唯一的Pareto最优纳什均衡CES能源交易策略.大量的仿真结果表明，完全竞争的CES模型提供了最佳的运营环境之间的CES运营商和用户的权衡。
英文摘要：
This paper, by comparing three potential energy trading systems, studies the feasibility of integrating a community energy storage (CES) device with consumer-owned photovoltaic (PV) systems for demand-side management of a residential neighborhood area network. We consider a fully-competitive CES operator in a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, a benevolent CES operator that has socially favorable regulations with competitive users, and a centralized cooperative CES operator that minimizes the total community energy cost. The former two game-theoretic systems consider that the CES operator first maximizes their revenue by setting a price signal and trading energy with the grid. Then the users with PV panels play a non-cooperative repeated game following the actions of the CES operator to trade energy with the CES device and the grid to minimize energy costs. The centralized CES operator cooperates with the users to minimize the total community energy cost without appropriate incentives. The non-cooperative Stackelberg game with the fully-competitive CES operator has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the CES operator maximizes revenue and users obtain unique Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium CES energy trading strategies. Extensive simulations show that the fully-competitive CES model gives the best trade-off of operating environment between the CES operator and the users.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
