Mechanism design has traditionally assumed that the set of participants are fixed and known to the mechanism (the market owner) in advance. However, in practice, the market owner can only directly reach a small number of participants (her neighbours). Hence the owner often needs costly promotions to recruit more participants in order to get desirable outcomes such as social welfare or revenue maximization. In this paper, we propose to incentivize existing participants to invite their neighbours to attract more participants. However, they would not invite each other if they are competitors. We discuss how to utilize the conflict of interest between the participants to incentivize them to invite each other to form larger markets. We will highlight the early solutions and open the floor for discussing the fundamental open questions in the settings of auctions, coalitional games, matching and voting.
Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network
由Li et al.（2017）开创的通过社交网络的拍卖在拍卖的机制设计文献中引起了相当大的关注。然而，没有已知的机制，满足防策略，无赤字，无浪费，和个人理性的多单位单位需求拍卖，除了一些幼稚的。在本文中，我们首先提出了一种机制，满足所有上述性质。然后，我们与两个天真的机制进行了全面的比较，表明所提出的机制在社会剩余，卖方的收入，并鼓励买方说实话。我们还分析了社会剩余的特点和收入所取得的建议机制，包括不断逼近的最坏情况下的效率损失和优化收入的复杂性，从卖方的角度来看。
Evolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare
Teesside University（提赛德大学）；University of Birmingham（伯明翰大学）；University of Maribor（马里博尔大学）；Community Healthcare Center Dr. Adolf Drolc Maribor（阿道夫·德罗尔奇博士马里博尔社区医疗中心）；Complexity Science Hub Vienna（维也纳复杂科学中心）；Kyung Hee University（庆熙大学）
