民主社会中的社交媒体与误导信息：一种机制设计方法
Social Media and Misleading Information in a Democracy: A Mechanism Design Approach
摘要：
在本文中，我们提出了一个资源分配机制的问题，激励过滤之间的有限数量的战略社会媒体平台。我们认为存在一个战略性的政府和私人知识的错误信息如何影响社交媒体平台的用户。我们提出的机制激励社交媒体平台有效地过滤误导性信息，从而间接防止假新闻的传播。特别是，我们设计了一个经济上的启发机制，强烈实现所有的广义纳什均衡有效过滤的误导性信息的诱导游戏。我们表明，我们的机制是个人理性的，预算平衡，但它至少有一个均衡。最后，我们表明，准凹效用和约束，我们的机制承认一个广义纳什均衡，并实现了帕累托有效的解决方案。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we present a resource allocation mechanism for the problem of incentivizing filtering among a finite number of strategic social media platforms. We consider the presence of a strategic government and private knowledge of how misinformation affects the users of the social media platforms. Our proposed mechanism incentivizes social media platforms to filter misleading information efficiently, and thus indirectly prevents the spread of fake news. In particular, we design an economically inspired mechanism that strongly implements all generalized Nash equilibria for efficient filtering of misleading information in the induced game. We show that our mechanism is individually rational, budget balanced, while it has at least one equilibrium. Finally, we show that for quasi-concave utilities and constraints, our mechanism admits a generalized Nash equilibrium and implements a Pareto efficient solution.
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