We study social choice mechanisms in an implicit utilitarian framework with a metric constraint, where the goal is to minimize \textit{Distortion}, the worst case social cost of an ordinal mechanism relative to underlying cardinal utilities. We consider two additional desiderata: Constant sample complexity and Squared Distortion. Constant sample complexity means that the mechanism (potentially randomized) only uses a constant number of ordinal queries regardless of the number of voters and alternatives. Squared Distortion is a measure of variance of the Distortion of a randomized mechanism.
Our primary contribution is the first social choice mechanism with constant sample complexity \textit{and} constant Squared Distortion (which also implies constant Distortion). We call the mechanism Random Referee, because it uses a random agent to compare two alternatives that are the favorites of two other random agents. We prove that the use of a comparison query is necessary: no mechanism that only elicits the top-k preferred alternatives of voters (for constant k) can have Squared Distortion that is sublinear in the number of alternatives. We also prove that unlike any top-k only mechanism, the Distortion of Random Referee meaningfully improves on benign metric spaces, using the Euclidean plane as a canonical example. Finally, among top-1 only mechanisms, we introduce Random Oligarchy. The mechanism asks just 3 queries and is essentially optimal among the class of such mechanisms with respect to Distortion.
In summary, we demonstrate the surprising power of constant sample complexity mechanisms generally, and just three random voters in particular, to provide some of the best known results in the implicit utilitarian framework.
Doing good vs. avoiding bad in prosocial choice: A refined test and extension of the morality preference hypothesis
亲社会性是人类社会生活的基础,因此,许多研究试图解释人类的亲社会行为。Capraro和Rand(Judgment and Decision Making,13,99-111,2018)最近提供的实验证据表明,匿名,一次性互动(如囚徒困境和独裁者游戏实验)中的亲社会性不是由基于结果的社会偏好驱动的-经典假设-而是由“做正确的事情”的广义道德偏好驱动的。在这里,我们认为Capraro和Rand(2018)报告的关键实验包括突出的方法论混乱和对有影响力的心理学理论有影响的开放性问题。具体而言,它们的设计混淆了:(1)效率偏好与自我利益;(2)行动偏好与道德偏好。此外,他们的设计未能将做“好事”的偏好与避免做“坏事”的偏好分开。因此,我们设计并进行了一个预先注册,完善和扩展的测试的道德偏好假设(N=801)。与这一假设相一致,我们的研究结果表明,在匿名的一次性独裁者游戏中,亲社会性是由做道德上正确的事情的偏好驱动的。然而,与有影响力的心理学理论不一致的是,我们的研究结果表明,在这种情况下,做“好事”的偏好与避免做“坏事”的偏好一样有效。
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost
University of Nebraska-Lincoln(内布拉斯加大学林肯分校);Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute(伦斯勒理工学院);Beijing Normal University-Zhuhai(北京师范大学珠海校区);Beijing Normal-Hong Kong Baptist University(北京师范大学-香港浸会大学联合国际学院)
Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules: Lower Bounds and Fairness Properties
我们在功利扭曲的框架下研究社会选择规则,并对代理人的成本进行了额外的度量假设。在这种方法中,这些成本由所有代理加上替代品的集合上的基础度量给出。社会选择规则只能获得代理人的顺序偏好,而不能获得导致它们的潜在基数成本。失真被定义为社会成本(通常是代理成本的总和)之间的比率选择的替代机制在手,并选择了最佳的替代由一个无所不知的算法。因此,社会选择规则在最坏情况下的扭曲,是衡量在不知道潜在成本的情况下,它总是接近最优选择的程度。在该模型下,已经证实,排名对,众所周知的加权锦标赛规则,达到了最多3的失真[Anshelevich et al. 2015]。我们通过构造一系列实例来证明这一猜想是错误的,这些实例表明排序对的最坏情况失真至少为5。我们对排名对的最坏情况失真的下限与Copeland规则的先前已知的上限相匹配,证明在最坏的情况下,更简单的Copeland规则至少与排名对一样好。只要我们受到(加权或未加权)锦标赛规则的限制,我们就证明随机化无法帮助实现小于3的预期最坏情况失真。在失真框架内使用近似优化的概念,我们证明了Copeland和随机独裁实现了较低的常数因子公平比(分别为5和3),这是对成本和单个最大成本目标的类似结果的相当大的推广。除了上述所有内容之外,我们还概述了该领域进一步研究的几个有趣方向。