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arXiv 1811.04786cs.GTcs.AIcs.MA
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具有随机约束的随机独裁者:社会选择的恒定样本复杂性机制

Random Dictators with a Random Referee: Constant Sample Complexity Mechanisms for Social Choice

Duke University(杜克大学);Stanford University(斯坦福大学)

Brandon Fain, Ashish Goel, Kamesh Munagala, Nina Prabhu

摘要:

我们研究了社会选择机制在一个隐含的功利主义框架与度量约束,其目标是最小化\textit{Distortion},最坏情况下的社会成本相对于基本的基数效用的顺序机制。我们考虑两个额外的必要条件:恒定的样本复杂性和平方失真。恒定的样本复杂度意味着该机制(可能是随机的)只使用恒定数量的序数查询,而不管投票者和备选方案的数量。平方失真是随机化机制的失真方差的度量。我们的主要贡献是第一个具有恒定样本复杂度\textit{and}恒定平方失真(这也意味着恒定失真)的社会选择机制。我们称这种机制为随机参考,因为它使用一个随机代理来比较另外两个随机代理最喜欢的两个选项。我们证明了使用的比较查询是必要的:没有机制,只有elalent的前k个首选的替代品的选民(常数k)可以有平方失真,是次线性的替代品的数量。我们还证明,与任何top-k唯一的机制,随机Reynolds的失真有意义地改善良性度量空间,使用欧几里德平面作为一个典型的例子。最后,在top-1机制中,我们引入了随机寡头。该机制仅要求3个查询,并且在失真方面在此类机制中基本上是最佳的。总之,我们展示了令人惊讶的力量,恒定的样本复杂性机制一般,特别是只有三个随机选民,提供一些最知名的结果,在隐式功利主义的框架。

英文摘要:

We study social choice mechanisms in an implicit utilitarian framework with a metric constraint, where the goal is to minimize \textit{Distortion}, the worst case social cost of an ordinal mechanism relative to underlying cardinal utilities. We consider two additional desiderata: Constant sample complexity and Squared Distortion. Constant sample complexity means that the mechanism (potentially randomized) only uses a constant number of ordinal queries regardless of the number of voters and alternatives. Squared Distortion is a measure of variance of the Distortion of a randomized mechanism. Our primary contribution is the first social choice mechanism with constant sample complexity \textit{and} constant Squared Distortion (which also implies constant Distortion). We call the mechanism Random Referee, because it uses a random agent to compare two alternatives that are the favorites of two other random agents. We prove that the use of a comparison query is necessary: no mechanism that only elicits the top-k preferred alternatives of voters (for constant k) can have Squared Distortion that is sublinear in the number of alternatives. We also prove that unlike any top-k only mechanism, the Distortion of Random Referee meaningfully improves on benign metric spaces, using the Euclidean plane as a canonical example. Finally, among top-1 only mechanisms, we introduce Random Oligarchy. The mechanism asks just 3 queries and is essentially optimal among the class of such mechanisms with respect to Distortion. In summary, we demonstrate the surprising power of constant sample complexity mechanisms generally, and just three random voters in particular, to provide some of the best known results in the implicit utilitarian framework.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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