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arXiv 2302.12140cs.GTecon.TH
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Super Condorcet域上的策略安全社会决策方案

Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains

Felix Brand, Patrick Lederer, Sascha Tausch

摘要:

多主体系统中的一个核心经济学范式是,主体不应该通过不诚实的行为而变得更好。在集体决策的背景下,这个公理被称为防策略性,即使在允许随机化的情况下,也是相当令人望而却步的。特别是,Gibbard的随机独裁定理表明,只有相当没有吸引力的社会决策计划(SDS)满足strategyproofness的全域的偏好。在本文中,我们获得了更积极的结果,通过调查策略证明SDS的孔多塞域,其中包括所有的偏好配置文件,承认孔多塞赢家。更详细地说,我们表明,如果选民的数量$n$是奇数,每一个strategyproof和非强加SDS的孔多塞域上可以表示为独裁SDS和孔多塞规则(选择孔多塞赢家概率$1$)的混合物。证明了当$n$是奇的时,Condorcet域是一个极大连通域,它允许有吸引力的防策略SDS,因为只有随机邻接是防策略的,并且对它的任意充分连通超集都是不加约束的.最后,我们还刻画了Condorcet域上的群防策略和非强制SDS集及其超集。这些特征加强了Gibbard的随机独裁定理,并建立了孔多塞域本质上是一个极大域,允许有吸引力的strategyproof SDS。

英文摘要:

One of the central economic paradigms in multi-agent systems is that agents should not be better off by acting dishonestly. In the context of collective decision-making, this axiom is known as strategyproofness and turns out to be rather prohibitive, even when allowing for randomization. In particular, Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem shows that only rather unattractive social decision schemes (SDSs) satisfy strategyproofness on the full domain of preferences. In this paper, we obtain more positive results by investigating strategyproof SDSs on the Condorcet domain, which consists of all preference profiles that admit a Condorcet winner. In more detail, we show that, if the number of voters $n$ is odd, every strategyproof and non-imposing SDS on the Condorcet domain can be represented as a mixture of dictatorial SDSs and the Condorcet rule (which chooses the Condorcet winner with probability $1$). Moreover, we prove that the Condorcet domain is a maximal connected domain that allows for attractive strategyproof SDSs if $n$ is odd as only random dictatorships are strategyproof and non-imposing on any sufficiently connected superset of it. We also derive analogous results for even $n$ by slightly extending the Condorcet domain. Finally, we also characterize the set of group-strategyproof and non-imposing SDSs on the Condorcet domain and its supersets. These characterizations strengthen Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem and establish that the Condorcet domain is essentially a maximal domain that allows for attractive strategyproof SDSs.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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