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arXiv 1605.09733cs.GT
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孔多塞--一致的、近似防策略的锦标赛规则

Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules

Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg

摘要:

我们考虑了$n$竞争者的循环锦标赛规则的可操纵性。具体地,$n$竞争者竞争奖品,并且锦标赛规则$r$将所有$\binom{n}{2}$成对匹配(称为锦标赛,$T$)的结果映射到获胜者的分布。规则$r$是孔多塞一致的,如果每当$i$赢得她的所有$n-1$比赛时,$r$以概率$1$选择$i$。我们考虑策略操纵的比赛中,玩家$j$可能会把他们的比赛玩家$i$,以增加的可能性,其中之一赢得比赛。无论PDMATHAMT选择这样做的原因是什么,只要$\Pr[r(T) = i]$增加的幅度大于$\Pr[r(T) = j]$减少的幅度,就存在操纵的可能性。不幸的是,众所周知,每一个孔多塞一致的规则是可操纵的(Altman和Kleinberg)。在这项工作中,我们解决的问题,如何操纵孔多塞一致的规则必须是-试图尽量减少之间的差异增加$\Pr[r(T) = i]$和减少$\Pr[r(T) = j]$的任何潜在的操纵对。我们发现,每一个孔一致的规则,实际上是$1/3$ -manipulable的,并选择一个赢家根据一个随机的单一消除括号是不是$α$ -manipulable的任何$α> 1/3$。我们还表明,许多以前研究的比赛格式都是$1/2$ -可操纵的,和流行的科普兰规则类(任何规则,选择一个球员与最多的胜利)都是事实上$1$ -可操纵的,最坏的可能。最后,我们考虑扩展到两个以上的球员之间的比赛固定。

英文摘要:

We consider the manipulability of tournament rules for round-robin tournaments of $n$ competitors. Specifically, $n$ competitors are competing for a prize, and a tournament rule $r$ maps the result of all $\binom{n}{2}$ pairwise matches (called a tournament, $T$) to a distribution over winners. Rule $r$ is Condorcet-consistent if whenever $i$ wins all $n-1$ of her matches, $r$ selects $i$ with probability $1$. We consider strategic manipulation of tournaments where player $j$ might throw their match to player $i$ in order to increase the likelihood that one of them wins the tournament. Regardless of the reason why $j$ chooses to do this, the potential for manipulation exists as long as $\Pr[r(T) = i]$ increases by more than $\Pr[r(T) = j]$ decreases. Unfortunately, it is known that every Condorcet-consistent rule is manipulable (Altman and Kleinberg). In this work, we address the question of how manipulable Condorcet-consistent rules must necessarily be - by trying to minimize the difference between the increase in $\Pr[r(T) = i]$ and decrease in $\Pr[r(T) = j]$ for any potential manipulating pair. We show that every Condorcet-consistent rule is in fact $1/3$-manipulable, and that selecting a winner according to a random single elimination bracket is not $α$-manipulable for any $α> 1/3$. We also show that many previously studied tournament formats are all $1/2$-manipulable, and the popular class of Copeland rules (any rule that selects a player with the most wins) are all in fact $1$-manipulable, the worst possible. Finally, we consider extensions to match-fixing among sets of more than two players.

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