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arXiv 2407.17569cs.GT
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关于针对规模至少为3的合谋的近似策略防伪锦标赛规则

On Approximately Strategy-Proof Tournament Rules for Collusions of Size at Least Three

David Mikšaník, Ariel Schvartzman, Jan Soukup

AI总结:

研究锦标赛规则防合谋问题,提出CC且3-SNM-1/2的新规则以严格改进现有工作,并推广随机单败淘汰赛规则及发起规则间归约研究。

摘要:

锦标赛组织者在观察所有 $\binom{n}{2}$ 场比赛后,必须从 $n$ 个可能的队伍中选出一支作为比赛的获胜者。组织者希望找到一个能同时满足以下条件的锦标赛规则。它必须是符合 Condorcet 的(以下简称 CC),即如果存在唯一一支击败所有其他队伍的队伍,则选其为获胜者。它还必须在概率 $α$ 下对规模为 $k$ 的群体具有强不可操纵性(以下简称 k-SNM-$α$),即任何 $\leq k$ 个队伍的子集都不能通过操纵它们之间的比赛来使其任一成员被选中的概率增加超过 $α$。我们的贡献有三个方面。首先,我们考虑将 [Schneider et al. 2017] 的随机单败淘汰赛规则自然推广到 $d$ 叉树,并给出了其可操纵性的上界。然后,我们提出了一种新的锦标赛规则,它是 CC 且 3-SNM-1/2 的,这是对 [Dinev and Weinberg, 2022] 提出的 CC 且 3-SNM-31/60 规则的严格改进。最后,我们发起了关于锦标赛规则之间归约的研究。

英文摘要:

A tournament organizer must select one of $n$ possible teams as the winner of a competition after observing all $\binom{n}{2}$ matches between them. The organizer would like to find a tournament rule that simultaneously satisfies the following desiderata. It must be Condorcet-consistent (henceforth, CC), meaning it selects as the winner the unique team that beats all other teams (if one exists). It must also be strongly non-manipulable for groups of size $k$ at probability $α$ (henceforth, k-SNM-$α$), meaning that no subset of $\leq k$ teams can fix the matches among themselves in order to increase the chances any of it's members being selected by more than $α$. Our contributions are threefold. First, wee consider a natural generalization of the Randomized Single Elimination Bracket rule from [Schneider et al. 2017] to $d$-ary trees and provide upper bounds to its manipulability. Then, we propose a novel tournament rule that is CC and 3-SNM-1/2, a strict improvement upon the concurrent work of [Dinev and Weinberg, 2022] who proposed a CC and 3-SNM-31/60 rule. Finally, we initiate the study of reductions among tournament rules.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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