arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1909.10645cs.GT
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区块奖励的公理化方法

An Axiomatic Approach to Block Rewards

Xi Chen, Christos Papadimitriou, Tim Roughgarden

摘要:

工作量证明区块链奖励每个矿工完成一个区块,奖励金额与矿工为挖掘区块贡献的哈希值数量成比例。这个比例分配规则是最优的吗?在什么意义上?还有哪些规则是可能的?特别是,任何“好的”分配规则应该满足的理想属性是什么?为了回答这些问题,我们开始在单个区块的时间尺度上对工作量证明区块链中的激励进行公理化理论。我们认为理想的属性的分配规则,包括:对称性;预算平衡(弱或强);防欺诈;和各种等级的防共谋。我们证明了比特币的比例分配规则是满足特定属性系统的唯一分配规则,但这并不适用于稍弱的属性集,或者当矿工不是风险中性时。我们还指出,可以在工作量证明区块链中近似实现丰富的分配规则。

英文摘要:

Proof-of-work blockchains reward each miner for one completed block by an amount that is, in expectation, proportional to the number of hashes the miner contributed to the mining of the block. Is this proportional allocation rule optimal? And in what sense? And what other rules are possible? In particular, what are the desirable properties that any "good" allocation rule should satisfy? To answer these questions, we embark on an axiomatic theory of incentives in proof-of-work blockchains at the time scale of a single block. We consider desirable properties of allocation rules including: symmetry; budget balance (weak or strong); sybil-proofness; and various grades of collusion-proofness. We show that Bitcoin's proportional allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying a certain system of properties, but this does not hold for slightly weaker sets of properties, or when the miners are not risk-neutral. We also point out that a rich class of allocation rules can be approximately implemented in a proof-of-work blockchain.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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