区块链纳什动态和追求合规
Blockchain Nash Dynamics and the Pursuit of Compliance
摘要：
我们在区块链协议的背景下研究纳什动态。我们引入了一个正式的模型，其中可以评估纳什动态是否可以导致效用最大化的参与者从“诚实”的协议操作缺陷，对变化，表现出一个或多个不可取的违规行为，如弃权参与和产生冲突的协议历史。不导致这种违规状态的区块链协议被认为是合规的。利用该模型，我们评估了各种工作量证明（PoW）和权益证明（PoS）协议族的合规性，关于不同的效用函数和奖励计划，导致以下结果：i）如果成本可以忽略不计，则资源比例奖励下的PoS分类账可以是合规的，但如果成本很大，则不合规; ii）区块比例奖励下的PoW和PoS表现出不同的合规行为，这取决于网络的损耗;一次违规，即，产生冲突的消息，但不符合（和不平衡）w.r.t.弃权或攻击，我们称之为自私的签名; iv）考虑到外部性，如汇率波动，我们量化了经济处罚的好处，在PoS协议的背景下，在抑制特定的违规行为。
英文摘要：
We study Nash-dynamics in the context of blockchain protocols. We introduce a formal model, within which one can assess whether the Nash dynamics can lead utility-maximizing participants to defect from the "honest" protocol operation, towards variations that exhibit one or more undesirable infractions, such as abstaining from participation and producing conflicting protocol histories. Blockchain protocols that do not lead to such infraction states are said to be compliant. Armed with this model, we evaluate the compliance of various Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocol families, with respect to different utility functions and reward schemes, leading to the following results: i) PoS ledgers under resource-proportional rewards can be compliant if costs are negligible, but non-compliant if costs are significant; ii) PoW and PoS under block-proportional rewards exhibit different compliance behavior, depending on the lossiness of the network; iii) PoS ledgers can be compliant w.r.t. one infraction, i.e., producing conflicting messages, but non-compliant (and non-equilibria) w.r.t. abstaining or an attack we call selfish signing; iv) taking externalities, such as exchange rate fluctuations, into account, we quantify the benefit of economic penalties, in the context of PoS protocols, in disincentivizing particular infractions.
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